This paper studies the role of the credit crunch in the severe contraction of economic activity during the 2008-09 global …nancial crisis, using …rm-level data from six emerging Asian economies. After controlling for the e¤ect of falling demand, we …nd that sales declined by less for …rms with better pre-crisis …nancial conditions. Amid the decline in external …nancing opportunities, some …rms relied more on trade credit from suppliers during the crisis, which allowed them to post relatively better sales. Export-intensive …rms resorted less to trade credit as an alternative source of …nance, which contributed to their larger declines in sales.
Introduction
The 2008-09 global …nancial crisis had dramatic e¤ects on the economic activity in both advanced and emerging market economies (EMEs). The contraction in EMEs was surprisingly large given that the crisis originated in the advanced economies. There are two main known channels through which the crisis could have spilled over to EMEs: the reduction in demand for these countries' exports (the trade channel) and the deterioration in …nancing conditions (the …nancial channel).
For the set of EMEs that we study in this paper (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand), the data suggest that both channels were at play during the crisis, a pattern discernible in both the aggregate and …rm-level data. As shown in Figure 1 , the downturn of activity in EMEs coincided with a worsening of …nancial conditions there. At the aggregate level (the top panels), the decline in real activity (real GDP, industrial production, exports) coincided with a marked slowdown in private credit growth. Similarly, at the …rm level (the bottom panels), the decline in sales for both domestic and export-oriented …rms coincided with a drop in their external …nancing.
Notably, the decline in exports was sharper than that of total output.
[LOCATE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Motivated by these observations, our study explores the e¤ect of …nancial frictions in general, and trade credit in particular, on economic activity in our sample of EMEs during the global …nancial crisis. Our focus on trade credit as an alternative source of …nancing during the recent crisis is guided by the …ndings of existing studies, which document the role of trade credit in mitigating …nancing constraints during past EME crises (see for example Love et al., 2007) . 1 More speci…cally, we use …rm-level data from the six emerging market countries mentioned above to explore: (1) Whether …nancial constraints, in the form of reduced access to external …nancing through bank loans and bond issuance, adversely a¤ected …rm-level sales during the crisis, after controlling for the deterioration in global demand. (2) Whether the ability of …rms to partially replace external …nance with trade credit from suppliers enhanced their relative performance during the crisis. (3) Whether the relative inability of export-intensive …rms to use trade credit as an alternative source of …nance contributed to the larger decline in sales experienced by these …rms.
As in some of the previous studies, we de…ne trade credit as the …nancing that …rms receive from their upstream suppliers in the form of delayed payments for the transfer of goods and services. 2 To disentangle the e¤ect of …nancial constraints from the demand-driven reduction in sales during the crisis, we use two types of explanatory variables in our regression analysis. First, we use …rms' pre-crisis degree of …nancial vulnerability and reliance on various sources of …nancing, including trade credit, to explain their sales performance during the crisis. Second, we construct …rm-speci…c measures of global demand, a novel approach that allows us to document the e¤ect of …nancial frictions on sales while controlling for the variation in demand.
Our results can be summarized as follows: (1) Financial conditions contributed to the decline in sales for all …rms, but sales declined by less for …rms with better …nancial conditions prior to the crisis, such as those with more liquid assets and less exposure to external …nance. Moreover, after controlling for pre-crisis …nancial characteristics and demand conditions during the crisis, the export-intensive …rms recorded larger declines in sales than their domestically-oriented counterparts. (2) Trade credit declined by less for the …nancially-vulnerable …rms, especially …rms with more exposure to short-term debt before the crisis, suggesting that some …rms relied more on trade credit to cope with the dire …nancial conditions during the crisis. In addition, …rms that were able to replace external …nance with trade credit during the crisis -predominantly the domesticoriented …rms -experienced smaller declines in sales than …rms that did not. (3) Exporters with comparable …nancial vulnerabilities had limited access to trade credit as an alternative source of …nancing, which contributed to the larger decline in their sales relative to non-exporters. These results highlight the interaction between …nancial constraints and the real sector in propagating the e¤ects of the global …nancial crisis. In addition, the …nding that trade credit was more scarce for exporters than for non-exporters points indirectly to the presence of …nancial frictions among the factors that contributed to the disproportionately large decline in exports during the crisis. 3 Our results are not driven by di¤erences in demand for domestic and export-oriented …rms, or by di¤erences in the …rms'pre-crisis levels of inventories. We control for the e¤ect of demand on …rm-level sales by constructing an index of global demand from …rm-level data on export reliance, sector-level data on exports by destination, and real GDP growth across destinations as a proxy for the change in demand. We also control for the role of …rms'inventories in o¤setting the impact of …nancial constraints on sales, since …rms may draw on inventories when their production is restrained by …nancial constraints.
Literature Review
Our study adds to the existing evidence -which is somewhat mixed -on the e¤ect of trade credit and …nancial constraints more generally on economic activity.
For trade credit and trade …nancing, Chor and Manova (2012) use …rm level data to show that the decline in U.S. imports during the 2008-09 global crisis was larger for countries of origin and sectors with adverse credit conditions, including limited reliance on trade credit. Similarly, Amiti and Weinstein (2011) document that trade …nancing from banks played a key role in the transmission of …nancial shocks to the Japanese exporting …rms during the crisis that a¤ected the country in the 1990s. However, using disaggregated U.S. imports and exports data, Levchenko et 3 The extent to which our results document the e¤ect of …nancial frictions on international trade is restricted by data availability, since our dependent variable is the quarterly change in …rm-level sales rather than in exports. However, we include the …rms'reliance on exports (available at the annual frequency only) in the set of explanatory variables. Compared with the papers mentioned above, we study the role of trade credit received from suppliers (rather than trade …nance received from banks or foreign a¢ liates) measured at the …rm level (rather than at the sector level) as an alternative source of external …nancing during the 2008-09 crisis. In addition to trade credit, we also examine the relationship between …rms'…nancial vulnerability prior to the crisis and their sales performance during the crisis, while also taking into account …rms'reliance on exports and exposure to global demand. Due to our focus on …rms from emerging Asia, the 2008-09 global …nancial crisis -which originated in advanced economies -can be viewed as an exogenous event in our analysis.
Our …nding that …nancially-vulnerable …rms (those with higher exposure to short-term debt before the crisis) substituted toward trade credit during the crisis is consistent with the literature 4 For another study, see also Kalemli-Ozcan, Kamil and Villegas-Sanchez (2010). on bank and trade credit channels. In an early study, Meltzer (1960) concludes that when liquidity conditions were tight, "…rms with relatively large cash balances increased the average length of time for which [trade] credit was extended. And this extension of trade credit appears to have favored those …rms against whom credit rationing is said to discriminate." More recently, Kohler et al. (2000) use a panel of publicly-traded …rms from the United Kingdom and …nd that, during recessions, …rms with direct access to capital markets extended more trade credit and received less in return, thus making credit available to other …rms that rely more on bank credit. In line with Meltzer (1960) , they argue that there is a "trade credit channel" that o¤sets the traditional bank credit channel in the monetary economics literature. 5 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 describes the empirical speci…cations, and Section 4 discusses the …ndings and robustness analyses. Section 5 concludes.
Data Description
Our empirical analysis uses annual and quarterly data for almost 6,000 publicly-traded manufacturing …rms from six emerging Asian countries -China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand -obtained from the Worldscope database. The choice of the six emerging market countries is driven by data availability. Given our interest in export status as one of the determinants of …rm performance in EMEs, we work with the countries where a reasonable number of …rms report both exports and sales for the pre-crisis years. Thus, about one quarter of the …rms in our sample with sales data for 2007 also report exports for the same year (about 1,600 …rms). 6 5 In Kohler, Britton and Yates (2000), an important assumption behind the idea of the o¤setting trade credit channel is that the adverse …nancial shock must cause the external …nance premium to rise by more for bankdependent …rms than for …rms with access to capital markets that provide trade credit. While a tightening of liquidity conditions may worsen …rms'access to bank credit, those …rms that can directly fund themselves in capital markets may step in to …ll the …nancing gap, thus reducing the e¤ect of the credit tightening on the economy. 6 The similarity in the patterns of aggregate and …rm-level data provides reassurance for the use of micro data to understand the linkages between …nancial conditions, trade, and economic activity during the global …nancial crisis. The richness of the micro data allows us to conduct the analysis while controlling for other factors that otherwise would have confounded estimation.
[LOCATE Using these micro data, our cross-sectional data set is constructed as follows. (See the summary statistics in Table 1 .) The dependent variable is the contraction in …rm-level activity during the crisis, measured by the percent decline in quarterly sales from peak (2008:Q3) to trough (2009:Q1).
Among the explanatory variables, the exports-to-sales ratio is constructed using data available at the annual frequency for 2007 (the pre-crisis year). For the baseline results, we treat …rms reporting sales but not exports as non-exporters, and assign them an exports-to-sales ratio equal to zero. This approach is supported by the property that export-reporting …rms in our sample have larger sales and larger total assets on average than …rms with missing exports, a pattern which is consistent with previous studies documenting that exporting …rms are larger than their domestically-oriented counterparts (Bernard et al., 2007) . 7 In the robustness analysis, we relax this assumption by exploring two additional methods to construct the export status of these …rms, and obtain similar results.
Also in the set of explanatory variables, the pre-crisis measures of …nancial vulnerability consist of working capital (the di¤erence between current assets and current liabilities, as an indicator of liquidity) and short-term debt, each normalized by total assets. There are also standard measures of external and internal …nancing prior to the crisis, computed as total external …nance and retained earnings normalized by total assets. In addition, the …rms'pre-crisis reliance on trade credit from suppliers is measured as the amount of accounts payable normalized by the cost of goods sold, following Love et al. (2007) and Levchenko et al. (2010) . 8 In addition to …rm-level data, we use annual data on exports by destination detailed at the two-digit sector level (provided by Comtrade) and quarterly real GDP data to construct a measure of global demand conditions during the crisis, as described in the next section.
One advantage of the Worldscope data is the availability of …rm-level sales at the quarterly frequency, even if the data on exports, working capital, short-term debt, external …nance and retained earnings are available at the annual frequency only. Thus, the data allow us to study the link between …rms' sales performance during the crisis measured quarterly (as the percent change in sales between the peak and trough quarters) and a set of …rm characteristics measured with annual data from the pre-crisis period. Given that the downturn and subsequent recovery of 7 After controlling for country and industry e¤ects, the export-reporting …rms in our sample had on average $177 million larger sales, and $128 million larger total assets than …rms not reporting exports for 2007. These di¤erences are statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level. 8 We multiply the ratio between accounts payable and the cost of goods sold by 360, and interpret the product as the number of days for which trade credit is received, as in Love et al. (2007) . economic activity in EMEs occurred over just a few quarters, the use of annual data to measure the peak-to-trough decline in sales would have understated the e¤ect of the crisis on sales and the corresponding variation across …rms. Out of the initial 6,000 …rms, our econometric analysis is con…ned to the sub-sample of …rms for which data are simultaneously available for the dependent and explanatory variables. The sample size is further reduced by the removal of outliers; we replace observations in both the top and bottom percentiles for external …nance (which can be either positive or negative) with missing values, and those in the bottom percentiles for retained earnings and working capital. For the exports-to-sales ratio, short-term debt, and accounts payable (which have a lower zero bound), we replace the outliers with missing values for observations in the top percentiles only.
Empirical Methodology
To study the cross-sectional behavior of …rm-level sales and trade credit received during the crisis, this paper uses three alternative econometric speci…cations, described by Models 1-3 below.
Model 1: Determinants of Firm Performance
The …rst model studies the determinants of …rm performance during the crisis, which is expressed as the peak-to-trough percent change in …rm sales between 2008:Q3 and 2009:Q1, and constitutes the dependent variable in the regression. The set of explanatory variables consists of …rm-speci…c characteristics, including …nancial vulnerability, reliance on di¤erent sources of …nancing, and export status all measured in 2007 (the pre-crisis year), as well as the change in the …rm-speci…c global demand conditions during the crisis. The econometric speci…cation is as follows:
where the explanatory variables are: 6. In the robustness analysis, we include additional variables such as the initial level of sales in 2008:Q3 to control for convergence e¤ects, two alternative measures of export status, as described in Section 4.2, and indices for domestic and external demand.
Demand Index
We construct the …rm-speci…c index of global demand as a function of the …rms'exports-to-sales ratio, the sector-speci…c exposure to demand from various foreign destinations, and the real GDP growth across destinations as a proxy for the change in demand during the crisis. Since the …rm-level export data are not detailed by destination, we use the sector-level data on exports by destination detailed at the 2-digit level (provided by Comtrade SITC rev.3) for each country of origin to approximate the …rms' exposure to foreign destinations. 10 For each sector and country of origin, we compute the shares of 31 export destinations for 2007. On average, the 31 destinations comprised more than 90 percent of our countries'exports. Thus, the sector-speci…c reliance on foreign markets is assigned to the corresponding …rms according to their primary sector of activity, country of origin, and …rm-speci…c degree of export reliance.
Using the method just described, the demand index (% Demand isc ) for …rm i in sector s and country of origin c is a weighted average of the change in domestic and external demand between 2008:Q3 and 2009:Q1, with the weights given by the …rm-speci…c exports-to-sales ratio (Exp/Sales i ) in 2007:
In equation (2) by the …rms in our sample. On the horizontal axis, the amount of external …nance (normalized by total assets) measures the ‡ow of …rm …nancing from outside sources in 2008, such as the issuance and/or retirement of stock and debt. Thus, negative values of external …nance correspond to …rms that repurchased equity or experienced declines in their outstanding debt during the crisis. 12 On the vertical axis, the di¤erence in the stock of accounts payable between 2007 and 2008 normalized 1 1 In the robustness analysis discussed in Section 4.2, the global demand index is split into its domestic and external demand components, namely (1 Exp=Salesi) % GDPc and Exp=Salesi P d w dsc % GDP d respectively, which enter separately in an alternative speci…cation for Model 1. In order to study the extent to which the substitution between external …nance and trade credit a¤ected sales during the crisis, we add a set of dummy variables (Quad q;i , for q = 1; 2; 3) to the speci…cation described by equation (1) . The dummy variables re ‡ect the …rms'distribution across the …rst three quadrants: 
We also include measures of …rm productivity (Prod i , including return on assets, gross pro…ts normalized by total assets, and sales normalized by total assets) and …rm size (TotalAssets i , replacing the size dummy) measured prior to the crisis, in order to address a potential endogeneity issue related to omitted variables. 13 Firms' productivity and size prior to the crisis are characteristics that may a¤ect both their sales and their access to trade credit (or external …nancing) during the crisis. For instance, this would be the case if the less productive and smaller …rms experienced a larger decline in both sales and trade credit received during the crisis.
On average, after controlling for …nancial characteristics, export status, demand, country, industry and size, we expect …rms in quadrant 1 to outperform their counterparts in quadrant 4, since their improved access to trade credit should o¤set, at least partially, the reduced access to external …nance. We also expect …rms in quadrant 2 to outperform those in other quadrants. Finally, …rms in quadrant 3 should fare better than those in quadrant 4.
In the robustness analyses, we include the initial level of sales in 2008:Q3 to control for convergence e¤ects, and use two alternative measures of export status.
Model 3: Determinants of Trade Credit
The third model studies the characteristics of …rms that received more trade credit from suppliers during the crisis. In particular, it explores whether the use of trade credit from suppliers as an alternative source of …nance di¤ered across exporters and non-exporters.
Payables CGS 
In the speci…cation described by equation (4), we use quarterly data to construct the dependent 
Results
This section discusses the baseline results for Models 1-3 described above.
Baseline Results

Model 1: Determinants of Firm Performance
The …rst column of Table 2 shows the baseline results for Model 1. The results suggest that, in addition to the deterioration in global demand, the …rm-speci…c …nancial conditions prior to the crisis a¤ected sales performance. Thus, greater …nancial liquidity ex-ante enhanced sales performance, as evidenced by the positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient for working capital. 14 The coe¢ cient estimate shows that, for …rms with working capital (normalized by total assets) one standard deviation above the mean, sales growth was 2.8 percentage points higher. In contrast, greater reliance on external …nance ex-ante a¤ected …rms'sales negatively during the crisis. Firms with external …nance (normalized by assets) one standard deviation above the mean su¤ered a 1.7
percentage points larger decline in sales.
The coe¢ cient on the demand index is positive and statistically signi…cant as we would expect.
Those …rms for which speci…c demand conditions deteriorated by one standard deviation (4.4
percentage points) more than the mean, sales growth was 6.8 percentage points lower. 15 It is notable, however, that even after controlling for the decline in global demand, the …rm-speci…c indicators of …nancial liquidity and reliance on external …nance prior to the crisis are statistically signi…cant with the expected signs. The results suggest that, in addition to demand, …nancial conditions contributed to the decline in …rm-level sales during the crisis.
Finally, export-oriented …rms experienced a relatively more severe deterioration in sales than their domestic-oriented counterparts. Thus, sales for …rms with one standard deviation more in exports as a fraction of sales before the crisis fell by 1.4 percentage points more during the crisis.
The results are preserved when we include the initial level of sales as an explanatory variable to control for convergence e¤ects (see column 2 of Table 2 ).
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Model 2: Substitution across Sources of Finance
Although greater reliance on external …nance prior to the crisis disrupted sales, the …rms'ability to substitute external …nancing with trade credit during the crisis enhanced their sales performance.
In Table 3 , the …rst column shows the baseline results for Model 2, which includes the substitution quadrants along with controls for …rm productivity and size.
The coe¢ cient on quadrant 1 is positive and statistically signi…cant, suggesting that …rms that were able to obtain more trade credit from suppliers experienced a smaller decline in sales (by about 8 percentage points less) relative to …rms in quadrant 4 (which experienced a reduction in both trade credit and external …nance during the crisis). The coe¢ cient on quadrant 3 is not statistically signi…cant, i.e. …rms with less trade credit but more external …nance did not fare better than …rms with less access to both sources of …nance, a result which highlights the importance of the trade credit dimension in understanding the sales performance across …rms. Thus, the ability to substitute away from external …nance towards trade credit enhanced sales, but the reverse was not true, possibly owing to the more onerous nature of external …nance at times of …nancial turmoil.
Finally, as expected, …rms in quadrant 2 (which obtained more trade credit and more external …nancing) experienced smaller declines in sales relative to the …rms in quadrant 4 (by almost 11
percentage points less).
We do not believe that the results for the quadrants are driven by reverse causality. Interestingly, once we control for the substitution between external …nancing and trade credit in Model 2, the coe¢ cient on the export-to-sales ratio becomes statistically insigni…cant (it was signi…cant in Model 1). This is consistent with the notion that exporters and non-exporters di¤ered in their ability to substitute external …nancing with trade credit. Indeed, in Figure 2 , out of the …rms in quadrants 1 and 2 (…rms that received more trade credit during the crisis), only 6.1 percent were export-intensive (with exports representing at least half of total sales), compared with 9.2 percent for the …rms in quadrants 3 and 4. 16 The pre-crisis …nancial indicators are statistically signi…cant and have the expected sign, in line with our previous results. Firms that were more …nancially liquid before the crisis performed better during the crisis; …rms with ex-ante working capital one standard deviation above the mean enjoyed 3.1 percentage points more in sales growth. Similarly, …rms with greater reliance on trade credit from suppliers before the crisis fared better; …rms with trade credit one standard deviation above the mean experienced 2.9 percentage points more in sales growth.
These results are preserved when we control for the initial level of sales, as shown in column 2 of Table 3 . The pre-crisis …nancial variables and the substitution quadrants preserve their sign and statistical signi…cance. In addition, the control variables for productivity (pro…ts and sales normalized by assets) and size (total assets) are positive and statistically signi…cant as expected.
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Model 3: Determinants of Trade Credit
Given that increased access to trade credit improved sales performance, the next set of results shed light on the characteristics of …rms that were able to use more trade credit as an alternative source of …nance during the crisis, based on the speci…cation in Model 3. Table 4 (…rst column) shows the baseline results for the link between the change in trade credit and …rm-speci…c indicators of …nancial vulnerability and export reliance measured prior to the crisis.
First, the more …nancially-vulnerable …rms increased their use of trade credit during the crisis, as shown by the coe¢ cient on short-term debt, which is positive and statistically signi…cant. The …nding indicates that some of the …nancially-vulnerable …rms used more trade credit as an alternative form of …nance, likely due to the fact that their short-term debt matured and became di¢ cult to rollover during the crisis. Firms with short-term debt one standard deviation above the mean received trade credit for 3.6 additional days from suppliers at the height of the crisis. This result is economically signi…cant, since for the average …rm, trade credit from suppliers declined by about 4 days from the peak to the trough quarters of the crisis (see Table 1 ).
Second, the more export-oriented …rms were less able to use trade credit as an alternative source of …nance. The results show a negative and statistically-signi…cant relation between the export share of sales in 2007 and the peak-to-trough change in trade credit during the crisis. Firms with exportsto-sales ratio one standard deviation above the mean received trade credit from suppliers for 1.2 less days. This result is consistent with the uneven distribution of export-oriented …rms across the four quadrants in Figure 2 , as discussed above. The …nding suggests that export-intensive …rms experienced less access to trade credit as an alternative source of …nance, which likely contributed to the decline in their sales.
The negative link between the ex-ante export status and the use of trade credit during the crisis is preserved in the robustness analysis when the initial level of trade credit is added to control for convergence e¤ects (column 2 of Table 4 ). It is also robust to alternative measures of export reliance (columns 3 and 4, also see Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2), and trade credit measured as accounts payable normalized by total assets rather than the cost of goods sold (column 5). In addition, the robustness analysis con…rms that …rms that were more vulnerable and less liquid ex-ante (i.e.
were more reliant on external …nancing and had less working capital) used more trade credit from suppliers during the crisis (see columns 4 and 5).
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Discussion
Our main results indicate that …nancially-distressed …rms received more trade credit during the crisis, which provided relief from the credit crunch and allowed them to maintain relatively better sales. However, exporters were less able to use trade credit as an alternative source of …nancing, consistent with our view that their more binding …nancial conditions contributed to the disproportionate decline in their sales during the crisis. These results raise two important questions. 
Additional Robustness Analysis
The baseline results described above are subject to some caveats, which are addressed in the next set of analyses.
Exports-to-sales ratio computed from logit model
The analysis so far assumed that …rms reporting sales but not exports for 2007 were non-exporters, and thus assigned a value of zero to their exports-to-sales ratio, as discussed in Section 2. There is a possibility that some exporters may fail to report exports data, in which case assigning zero values to their exports-to-sales ratio could be problematic.
To ensure that our results are not driven by this assumption, we re-estimate Models 1, 2 and 3 with an alternative measure of export reliance, using the following approach. First, we estimate a logit model for the sub-sample based on …rms that reported either positive or zero exports for 2007. The dependent variable is the exporting status (exporter vs. non-exporter), and the predictor variable is the log of the sales-to-total assets ratio in 2007 as a proxy for …rm productivity, along with dummy variables to control for industry and country of origin. 17 This approach follows the well-established empirical result from previous studies that exporting …rms are larger and more productive than their domestically-oriented counterparts (Bernard et al., 2007) .
The results indicate a positive and statistically signi…cant slope coe¢ cient for the log of the salesto-total assets ratio, suggesting that the probability of the …rm being an exporter increases with …rm productivity. Second, using the logit estimate, we compute the probability of exporting as a function of productivity for all the …rms in our sample, including for …rms that did not report exports but reported sales and total assets for 2007. 18 Third, the resulting export probabilities are used as a proxy for export status in Models 1, 2 and 3. In addition, the global demand index is re-computed using the new proxy for the exports-to-sales ratio.
The results, presented in the third column for each of Tables 2, 3 and 4, are largely similar to the baseline results for each model, con…rming that the assumption of zero exports for the missing observations does not materially a¤ect our baseline results. In Table 2 (column 3), the coe¢ cient for working capital is still positive and statistically signi…cant, while those of external …nance and export intensity are negative and statistically signi…cant. In Table 3 (column 3), the coe¢ cients on quadrants 1 and 2 are still positive and statistically signi…cant. In Table 4 (column 3), the coe¢ cient on export status is negative and statistically signi…cant.
Constructing the export status for non-reporting …rms from the logit model has the advantage that it generates variation in the exports-to-sales ratio using a reasonable economic assumption (i.e. export status depends on …rm productivity). One possible limitation of this approach arises from the inability to determine the properties of the second-stage estimator, which depend on the extent to which the sub-sample of …rms reporting exports (used in the logit, …rst-stage estimation)
is representative of the entire sample of …rms used in the second-stage regression. However, we do not believe that this limitation drives our results. To be sure, we perform an additional robustness check by imputing the …rm-level export status from sector-level averages as described below.
Exports-to-sales ratio from sector averages
On a country-by-country basis, we assign the average exports-to-sales ratio computed at the 3-digit sector level to the …rms in that sector that have missing export observations for 2007. We use sector-level average ratios to impute exports at the …rm level for each country if at least three …rms in that sector and country reported exports. However, we keep the original exports-to-sales ratio for …rms that report either zero or positive exports.
The results for the determinants of sales performance, presented in the fourth column of Tables   2 and 3 , are similar to the baseline results for each model. Similarly, in the fourth column of Table   4 , the negative link between export status and trade credit during the crisis is consistent with the baseline results from the …rst column.
Domestic vs. External Demand
In order to assess the impact of domestic vs. external demand conditions separately on sales performance during the crisis, the global demand index in equation (2) is split into its domestic and external demand components, namely (1 Exp=Sales i ) % GDP c and Exp=Sales i P w dsc % GDP d , respectively. The two components are included separately in the estimation of Model 1. 19 The results, reported in column 5 of Table 2 , show positive and statistically signi…cant links between …rm sales and each of the domestic and external components of demand. In addition, column 6
shows the results for the measures of domestic and external demand interacted with country dummy variables. To save space, only the country interactions with statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients are reported. 20 For domestic demand, the interacted terms are positive and statistically signi…cant for Malaysia and Thailand, economies which su¤ered large real GDP contractions during the crisis. 21 Notably, for external demand, the interacted terms are positive and statistically signi…cant for China, Malaysia, and Thailand, suggesting that sales of …rms in these countries were more sensitive to the deterioration in external demand.
Inventories
One potentially important variable missing from the headline analysis is the level of …rms'inventories. Inventories play an important role in meeting demand when production is disrupted. During the …nancial crisis, …rms with production constrained by the dire …nancial conditions could have drawn on inventories to ful…ll some or all of the demand for their products. In this case, …nancial conditions would have a smaller e¤ect on sales.
We re-estimate Models 1 and 2 for the determinants of sales performance while controlling for 1 9 The export-to-sales ratio is excluded due to its perfect correlation with the domestic demand component within each country.
2 0 The complete set of results for the interacted variables are available upon request. 2 1 In contrast, China, India and Indonesia are among the few EMEs that did not contract during the 2008-09 crisis.
the inventories-to-sales ratio measured in 2007. Indeed, the results in Table 5 show positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients on the inventories-to-sales ratio (columns 1 and 3), indicating that …rms with higher levels of inventories relative to sales prior to the crisis experienced a relatively smaller decline in sales during the crisis. In addition, the speci…cations in columns (2) and (4) interact the inventories-to-sales ratio with the …nancial variables already discussed. The coe¢ cients on the interacted terms with short-term debt and external …nance are statistically signi…cant and have the expected signs. Thus, the sales of …rms with higher pre-crisis levels of inventories relative to sales were less constrained by their vulnerability position or reliance on external …nance. These results point to an important role of inventories in alleviating, but not eliminating, the e¤ect of …nancial constraints on performance, as our benchmark results indicate.
[LOCATE 
Conclusions
We explore the extent to which …nancial conditions contributed to the decline in …rms'sales at the height of the 2008-09 global …nancial crisis using micro data from six emerging market economies in Asia. Even after controlling for demand, we …nd that …nancial conditions adversely a¤ected sales during the crisis, and that the use of trade credit played an important role in the relative performance of …rms. In particular, when …nancing conditions deteriorated, the more …nancially-vulnerable …rms turned to trade credit from suppliers as a supplement to other forms of …nancing.
In addition, …rms that were able to replace external …nance with trade credit had better sales. In contrast to domestic-oriented …rms, export-intensive …rms with comparable …nancial vulnerability relied less on trade credit as an alternative source of …nancing, and experienced sharper declines in sales.
Our …ndings have implications for the design of policy to cushion the e¤ect of future …nancial crises. Policy makers and …rms would be well-advised to explore the development of trade credit as an additional source of …nancing, which might not be as desirable in normal times, but could prove useful during crises when credit markets become impaired.
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